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Does the United States **need** the capability to destroy nearly all human life on the planet? (along with all other primates)?

Should the president of the United States (continue to) have the capability to direct the rapid destruction of all human life on the planet?

The “option” to do that is now—and always has been—among the nuclear “options” automatically presented to the president, for his decision, in a time of intense crisis (or tactical warning—up until now, always false—from electronic and other sensors).

Should that be among the president’s options?

He does have that capability—and presidents have had it for sixty years (though for half that time, without knowing it)—with high confidence that it would be accomplished, starting within minutes, on the basis of a single order from him for the launching of existing, operational missiles on high alert against pre-chosen targets.

That highly reliable capability has been developed, bought, produced, deployed, “modernized, and maintained up-to-date over half a century for him and all his predecessors since Eisenhower.

(Has a president ever been made aware that that “omnicidal” result is not only possible but likely if he were to choose any of the larger attack options, or perhaps for all of them?)

Should the president delegate the authority to order that, in case he is physically unable to do so? To how many?

(How many now have that authority, in some circumstances? Or, physical capability, if not authority?)

Should the president of **Russia** have the option, or capability, to destroy nearly life on earth?

He does, like the president of the US.

Some other national leaders may have it, too, with their much smaller forces, but with less assuredness. If underground testing of warheads were renewed, and France and China acquired multiple warheads for their missiles as a result, they too would probably join the club with the national capability of ending life on earth: the Doomsday Club.

With currently deployed forces, the other nuclear weapons states probably do not now have this full capability to destroy most human and all other primate life. However, even those two of the nine nuclear weapons with the smallest of these nuclear arsenals (aside from North Korea, which may or may not have any operational warheads, or at most ten fissile warheads)—namely, India and Pakistan—would, in an exchange involving only one hundred A-bomb warheads of Hiroshima size (the detonators of the thousands of thermonuclear H-bomb possessed by the US and Russia, and in hundreds by the others) kill some two billion people by starvation, from the effects on global harvest of the smoke lofted from the cities they burned.

Do the presidents of India and Pakistan need to be able to kill two billion people around the world?

That would be the effect (within a year or so, by starvation from failure of harvests due to reduced sunlight from the smoke) of launching their current arsenals according to their current plans to attack opposing command and control and urban-industrial targets.

Should they possess that capability, to be used at their discretion? Do they have the right either to threaten or knowingly to bring about such an effect? Should they have operational plans and capabilities to do that,--as they almost certainly do (whether or not they have explicitly calculated that result)-- under any circumstances whatever?

Should other nations of the world—all of whom have populations significantly at risk from such an exchange—allow India and Pakistan to have that capability? Is that threat—to the world!—legitimate, legal, moral, tolerable? (Is there anything any of them can do about it?)

Do the presidents of Russia and of the US **have the right** to be able—physically, legally, organizationally, technically—to destroy civilization and most larger life on earth? Knowing—as they can and should know (even if they don't, yet)—that the execution of existing current operational plans in their respective “footballs” (the briefcase containing their strategic nuclear “options” for immediate execution and the authentication codes necessary to order them) would bring about Doomsday?

No one would trust the leaders of Al Qaeda with the capability to destroy one city: nor should they. Should we trust the leaders of Pakistan with ability to trigger an exchange with India that would kill two billion people?

Who should we trust with management of a well-oiled Doomsday Machine?

Russia?

The US?

January 13, January 16, 2015

Questions about my aims in my book:

- 1) What's on my mind?
- 2) What do I want to tell the public? What do I want them to know, that they don't? Why aren't they thinking at all about these problems; how could that be changed?
- 3) And/or: do I want to change the minds of the anti-nuclear community? What is it that I think they've missed, so long? What do they ignore?
- 4) What in (my view of) their understanding of the problems and the era limits their effectiveness, causes them to be unheard either by the public or by the administration?
- 5) What secrets have I held to myself (mainly, or with respect to published writing) for (too) long?
- 6) What response do I want? What do I want to happen as a result of any discussion I can cause?
- 7) What hopes for effect are realistic? What would a full program be? Which of the consequences below are most achievable (or, least unachievable)?

My answers, not in order above:

On (6):

- (a) I want investigations by scientific bodies [like the NAS] with access to classified war-plans or at least to sufficient classified data to determine weapons effects on sunlight and crops/famine, nuclear winter/famine. DGZ's, proximity to and effects on cities and flammable materials, weapons yields, height of burst, likely "error" impacts near cities: for all different options, especially large ones. Thus, **how much smoke will various options generate?** (I'm trying to encourage such studies, with Frank von Hippel and others, aside from my book; but I would hope my book would contribute to this prospect).
- (b) Thus I want to see confirmed authoritatively the reality of the nuclear winter/famine thesis, as related to actual existing war-plans—not just hypothetical ones, calculations by people who can be dismissed as ignorant of actual plans—showing that the danger/likeness of this hasn't really

been changed by reductions in warheads or by the existence of “options” less than all-out.

- (c) This will also inform the president—for the first time, I conjecture—what the actual effects of his supposed “options” are: and that most of them, if not all the realistic ones (excluding “demonstration” shots or highly limited ones) risk or cause significant nuclear winter: along with the previously-underestimated effects of fire and fallout, and ozone effects.
- (d) In other words, he would learn that there is little significant difference among his “options”; the larger ones **all** approach being omniscidal, suicidal as well as mass-murderous; **“damage-limiting” by counterforce, decapitation, preemptive attack is a delusion** (as it has been for half a century);
- (e) The threat of such attacks (any of the options) under any circumstances, including second strike, is **the threat of a suicide-bomber with his finger on a Domsday Machine**: a threat of destruction not just to a limited number of people in a limited, specific vicinity (like, a nation! As in WWII) but to the whole population of the planet, holding all humans as hostage.

Obviously an illegitimate (insane) threat: as is the capability to carry it out.

Such a threatener should be seen as violating the preemptory norms of *jus cogens*, **“an enemy of all humankind”**; deserving of outraged protest of all nations and their populations and leaders, condemnation, resistance: a universal demand, if not for judgment in court and punishment (impractical for a superpower in its own courts or the ICC, although subject to universal jurisdiction), for immediate and sweeping change.

[This is perhaps a key controversial issue. Is it, in these terms, criminal to make such a threat, and be prepared to carry it out (even if it is meant as a bluff—which has not generally the case)? As distinct from carrying it out? Is it, in international law, criminal to **threaten** genocide (as Hitler did in January, 1939)? Evidently not, or our plans for retaliation to nuclear attack, among others, would be clearly criminal.

On the other hand, these plans constitute a credible threat not just of multi-genocide but **omnicide**. If carried out, there would be no possibility of recrimination or prosecution or punishment: the “smoking gun would be the smoke from a thousand cities,” the death-knell for all courts and human endeavors. So, can the threat, and preparations to carry it out (conspiracy to commit omnicide) be legal, permissible? At this moment, it is considered so, not only by the NWS

but in view of the lack of determined challenge from all other nations.]

- (f) The publication of such data, and such implications as the above, should be confirmed **by legislative hearings**, with sworn testimony under penalty of perjury, with encouragement of whistle-blowers from within (and former officials), with further investigation as needed (as to how this posture came about, against what internal criticism, with what internal rationalization; how it has been kept secret so long, what lies have been told about it).
- (g) These hearings should not only be American but held in every nuclear wns state, and to the extent possible in every other state. Actually, nuclear and environmental scientists all over the world, in every country, could and should engage in these investigations and discussions. For example, Germany and Japan are “NNWS” (non-nuclear weapons states) with the full expertise to contribute to this world-wide process of investigation and education.
- (h) **Operation Candor world-wide**, but necessarily starting in the major NWS (nuclear weapons states): ideally, the US, and Russia; but quite feasibly in France and England; China, India and Pakistan, Israel. (Just for threat and deterrence purposes, imagine North Korea telling **truthfully** what a half-dozen of their “tiny” atomic weapons would do! Though they, perhaps alone of the NWS, couldn’t produce a significant nuclear winter effect, as could India and Pakistan together.)
- (i) Such **worldwide hearings**, scientific investigation(s), and education of the president, would totally discredit the scale of US (and Russian) missile forces, not only **land-based missiles but also the scale of SLBMs**, especially American, which are also currently sized to be counterforce, preemptive forces. **These should be cut back drastically, perhaps by 90%, either unilaterally or together, at most to a force that cannot produce major nuclear winter. This would mean to the neighborhood of the present North Korean forces, though invulnerably based (SLBMs)!**
- (j) As a first step, both of highest urgency and greatest feasibility, **eliminate US land-based missiles**. They are supposedly for offensive, preemptive damage-limiting, which is infeasible against Russia, and being vulnerable on both sides they encourage preemption by **either** side on possibly false alarms or in response to limited war. There is no excuse for their continued deployment, posing as they do by their very existence (not only their launch by the US) the risk of Russian-caused, as well as US-caused, nuclear famine and human near-extinction.
- (k) **Renounce FU threats, both by the US and by NATO**. Against Russia (as in Ukraine), they threaten nuclear winter as an almost-certain consequence of

being carried out. Elsewhere they are both grotesquely disproportionate and promote proliferation.

- (l) Campaign to **get others to do the same, to adopt NFU** (no first use) policies—**necessarily** from the position of having given up ourselves such FU threats ourselves (admittedly belatedly) and having dismantled the forces meant to support such threats. (Pakistan and Israel must be expected to be particularly reluctant to do this, since their forces—like ours!—have been acquired primarily to make FU threats.)
- (m) In bilateral discussions, **urge Russia to join us in this**, i.e., to withdraw from their recent adherence to Eisenhower-era New Look reliance on nuclear weapons, both for FU and Type I deterrence, including damage-limiting. “Educate” them, from our new position: “**We were wrong**: as is now obvious from the new data and investigations. Don’t make the same mistakes!” Collaborate with them on studies of the nature above (which, in fact, they seem to have done before us: though they are now in the process of ignoring their own earlier studies of nuclear winter).
- (n) Bring maximum international **pressure on India and Pakistan to terminate their nuclear build-ups and to reduce their own forces to minimum deterrence (North Korea?) levels, not threatening limited nuclear winter**. The same must be asked of **all** the NWS, but it is especially urgent in the case of India and Pakistan because of their recurrent threats and wars, and they are already closer to this level anyway.

(In imitation of historic US doctrine and practice, Pakistan, Israel, North Korea have rationales for FU forces at least as strong as NATO ever had. It will be hard or impossible to induce them either to adopt NFU or to eliminate their arsenals entirely—to enter the NPT as NNWS!—even if the US reduces and renounces FU: but certainly impossible even to get them to stop their arms buildup if the US does not do either of these!)
- (o) In connection with worldwide Operation Candor, bring the US and NATO into accord with the worldwide condemnation of FU (**UN 1981**) and of the arsenals of the NWS and their failure (see the suit by the Marshall Islands) to observe Article 6 or the NPT. **Oppose proliferation, at last, from the position of this recognition and corresponding actions by the US and NATO**.
- (p) Initiate negotiations among the NWS toward **a convention banning nuclear weapons**.
- (q) Perhaps initially, aim at a worldwide ban on FU threats and preparations for it, renunciation of damage-limiting or preemption and of the forces

addressed to it in the US and Russia; and rejection of all forces risking nuclear winter!

Without rejecting—on the contrary—the longer-term NPT aim of the elimination of nuclear weapons, aim at an interim goal of worldwide **minimum deterrence** by the NWS, where the “minimum” refers to “sole purpose Type-I deterrence only, rejection of damage-limiting, preemption and “extended deterrence,” (nuclear umbrellas!),” and **limitation to forces, at most, in all NWS that do not threaten nuclear winter (“closer to 1 than 100” as York put it)**. (A lot closer, given the nuclear winter effect of smoke, of which York was unaware at the time he made that estimate).

- (r) Yes, I am saying, **give up exclusive or main focus on the goal of a short-term achievement of a total ban to be implemented in the short-run**, in favor of a strong pursuit of the posture described above as an interim step toward elimination.. (This relates to (7) below.)

This is **not** a counsel of despair (except with respect to totally unrealistic hopes of a short-run achievement of a total ban with or without a short deadline, let alone of its implementation in the short-run). Negotiation toward a total ban should indeed commence immediately: but there is no hope whatever of achieving such agreement (even with a long deadline) unless virtually all of the aims above have been achieved, or at least promised and pursued.

In other words, I believe there will never be a ban that has not been **preceded** by virtually all of the changes aimed at above: so that aiming at that those changes in no way compromises the goal of total elimination, but rather aims at making it feasible. (Some others will argue the contrary, that to abandon their almost exclusive or predominant public focus on total elimination as the sole worthwhile goal and achievement is to reduce the chance of achieving it, from already low to still lower or to zero. I strongly disagree.)

- (s) Those changes toward the posture above (q) would provide a basis for the first time of the genuine **delegitimation of nuclear weapons and threats**. (That has sometimes been described as an existing state of affairs, or at least the declared aim of the US: neither of which can remotely be regarded as true, with the postures and declarations of all the NWS led by the US and Russia).

That **delegitimation**—and hopefully, for many, a passion for change in our policies and those of Russia and the other NWS-- could be described as the most immediate and most important aim of my book. I aim to bring the readers through the same disillusioning process of understanding our

nuclear policies and of recognizing their illegitimacy--even madness, evil, and extreme danger to humanity-- that I underwent myself half a century ago.

On (7): realism of aims in (9) above:

--The elimination of the land-based missile leg of the "triad" (j) seems most feasible. There have been proponents of this in each of the Pentagon reviews of the last decade (who?), though they were over-ruled

It makes sense in every respect: except for the interests of the ICBM caucus. Is that enough to kill it, or not? The latest news is that they have, killed it, that refurbishment of the land-based missile force is on the way. Spurred on, ironically, by the Schlosser revelations, in his book and by Rachel Maddow and others, of the "antiquated" and ill-maintained status of the force.

Another current obstacle: Any "unilateral" reduction, like eliminating the Minuteman Force, is now proclaimed to be a "wrong message" to the Russians, in the context of Ukraine. Bullshit! Are MM (Minutemen) supposed to be relevant to Ukraine? If so, we need to take a hard look at just what we are threatening to do, and its risks! Still, that probably will rule out any such move...until my book is published, in a year!

The argument, in my book and elsewhere, that these missiles are not only unneeded—anachronistic (by half a century)—but are positively **dangerous**, more so than any other element in the posture, is potentially compelling, certainly valid. There is also a cost argument—as there is with the whole refurbishment program--but this dangerousness may be the most vulnerable element.

They serve, if anything, only to support the credibility of a Mad FS threat: which we absolutely should not be making: a conclusion from the revelations in my book (along with the nuclear winter revelations).

--The next most likely achievement would be (see a-e, g-h) an NAS study (or conceivably by some other body: NRDC, again? A redo of the NRDC study of FS, allowing this time for smoke, nuclear winter! Yes, that's not only feasible, it's obligatory. (Paine, Cochran). FAS. Von Hippel and Robock (on my suggestion: **check how that's going**) are both pressing the NAS to do such a study, with some encouraging response from its president.

--After these, there's quite a decline in likelihood. That applies even to (f) above, a Congressional investigation following or along with a scientific study; the chance seems very low with a Republican Congress.

(Perhaps the chance of an internal Executive study is considerably more than before, both with the first two items and even others, in the last two years of Obama, with Ashton Carter as SecDef! (Though even Hagel had come out for Global Zero, before being nominated; that didn't do anything for us.) This is the first SecDef genuinely knowledgeable about nuclear weapons (as well as the bureaucracy: almost uniquely so) in a long time—since McNamara? Or, Harold Brown? But Brown was “conservative”, in effect, hawish. Les Aspin, briefly, was over Carter and was in line with his thinking. Carter is the most promising one since Aspin!

--An **attack on damage-limiting** (c, d, e, m) would be promising **given** a Congress and public newly educated by my book, and a resulting Congressional hearing. But the latter would be very hard to get under the Republicans (or even Democrats, to be fair). It would be unprecedented. My book will at least raise the issue, almost for the first time (though implicitly, by NRDC studies). This crucial issue has been missing, “forever.” from the antinuclear campaigns.

Of course, to forego “damage-limiting” has a bad, counterintuitive ring to it: like foregoing ballistic missile defense. Yet the latter was made fairly widely plausible by a determined educational campaign. Counterforce against Russia (or the US, by Russia) can be subject to an equally compelling public critique.

--A campaign **against preemption, counterforce, decapitation (delegation)**. (i, j, m, n, q) (subject to the same reservations as above). That not only strengthens the case for dismantling the Minuteman force, but it points to massive reductions, both unilateral and bilateral (as a necessary precursor to reductions in all the other NWS except for North Korea), including the sub-based SLBMs.

--Still less likely, unfortunately, NFU, as of now. The arguments for NFU (no first use) (e, k, l, m, q) have always, to my mind, been very strong; but this is recognized by relatively few people even among anti-nuclear specialists (with any passion, comparable to mine), and hardly any in Congress or the public. This is true despite support for it being almost universal among NNWS; it's opposed only by NWS, led and strong-armed by the US. The latter includes NATO, despite the fact that Germany has long proposed it! (Do they still?)

The logic of it has seemed rationally compelling since the fall of the Berlin Wall, 25 years ago—as has, the dismantling of the first-strike forces. At least, that was true until Georgia and Ukraine (which in no way supports FU threats from a reasonable strategic point of view, but serves nuclear hawks demagogically. (Remember McCain's “We are all Georgians now!” Now, I suppose, “Ukrainians.” As well as “Charlie.”)

But, unhappily, the “new Europe,” like Poland, oppose NFU—preferring Madman threats, vs. Russia, especially with the Ukraine crisis. It's truly a threat of an insane initiative by NATO, though that is not to deny that it can have some deterrent effect, as it did over Berlin. This time, Russia (no longer overwhelming in conventional

strength vs. NATO) has also been making equally insane noises: a very dangerous situation.

In this climate, NFU hasn't much prospect of short-run adoption: though it has **never** been more urgently needed (and, unlike Berlin, FU threats are far from necessary or optimal compared to alternatives).

My book should raise the issue of FU threats—the real basis of our foreign policy for sixty years—and of the urgent need for NFU, almost for the first time either for the public or for many antinuclear and arms control specialists. Likewise, the association of FU threats and our strategic, FS posture and its oversized offensive forces (and the resulting stalemate in arms reduction measures).

A year from now, when the book appears, might be a better time than just now for NFU adoption (as for Minuteman elimination), if Ukraine simmers down. (ALL our foreign policy objectives—"ours," not the new-cons—virtually require the reestablishment of US-Russian détente and active collaboration. If we don't get it—well, all is lost (just about), not only in nuclear matters but on climate, the Middle East, terrorism...

Even with that, NFU and radical reductions are far from assured, or even likely, but they would have a chance. And my book should help.

--A **genuine anti-proliferation campaign** with real prospects of effectiveness (o) awaits the changes above, all of them. But with them, a real chance of it. Total roll-back of the Israel, India, Pakistan or North Korea nuclear arsenals, a return to their status as NNWS, is chimerical, a blind alley: except as part of a global ban. But an end to their increases, and undermining of their first-use threats, is possible, if led by the above changes in the superpowers and other NWS.

(My book will at least expose that the declared US aim of non-proliferation has been on the whole a hoax for the last quarter-century, and will help explain the reasons why US policy has not only precluded such an effective campaign but continues to promote proliferation. That will not change until all the changes above are implemented; but that realization is another incentive for such changes (perhaps, as proposed in the Gilpatric Report forty years ago, that objective might serve as the critical motivation for them).

Worldwide delegitimation of possession of nuclear weapons and threats (6-s, above) will **not** occur without major changes having occurred in the policies and nuclear postures of the NWS, especially the US and Russia.

No one book, by itself, will go very far toward advancing that. But mine might, at its best, have that delegitimizing and mobilizing effect on many of its readers. And if

enough of them catalyze and join a movement to achieve worldwide scientific and legislative investigation of the issues I raise, with resulting confirmation and publicity to the proposals, it will have made a useful contribution. That is my most ambitious, not-unrealistic aim.

[AGREED].

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On (3) Changing the minds of the arms control community:

I hope to enlighten both arms control specialists and anti-nuclear activists about matters on which they—along with the public—have long been largely ignorant, and as a result, silent:

- (a) The functions, purposes—the actual uses-- of our nuclear weapons, both strategic and tactical. (**Not** Type I deterrence “only” or even mainly, i.e., deterrence of nuclear attack on the US). Including Type II or extended deterrence, nuclear “umbrellas” for our clients and allies (and our own forces) against nuclear attack but against non-nuclear attack (NATO, Dienbienphu, Khe Sanh, Danang) and potentially to break a non-nuclear stalemate (Nixon in Vietnam).
 - i) Damage-limitation, in US preemption or escalation against the Soviet Union/Russia.
 - ii) Profits for the MIC, budgets for the Labs and votes and contributions Congress and presidential candidates.
 - iii) Alliance relationships and US hegemony in NATO.
- (b) In particular, the **linkage of strategic weapons to tactical weapons threats**: to back up tactical weapons in a FU role, to deter Soviet (or now Russian, in Ukraine) second-use retaliation (or FU) by threatening a disarming FS against the SU/Russia. Thus the “need” for large numbers, land-based weapons, accuracy of both land-based and sub-launched weapons, large numbers of SLBMs and Tridents.
- (c) The key role of “**damage-limitation**” (scarcely mentioned or known in arms control or anti-nuclear activism), in planning and in determining the size and nature of our weapons, their alert status, planning, readiness for preemption and launch -on-warning (with the risk of “inadvertent” war based on false

alarm or **mistaken strategic “warning”** (the latter rarely mentioned, if ever: preemption on the mistaken belief that escalation of a limited regional war by the opponent is inevitable); delegation and its dangers; planning for decapitation (and, inexplicably, publicity about this!). **Above all, the practical infeasibility of this against Russia for the last half-century.**

- (d) The **first-strike posture** of our strategic weapons, both land-based and, increasingly, sub-launched.
- (e) The **number and occasions of US first-use threats**, most of them secret. (Question: how much does even Congress, or congressional leaders, know about these?) The history of denial about these (despite occasional revelations, by Eisenhower/Dulles or Nixon). E.g. Bundy’s history. (See a and b above).
- (f) **How close some of these, including the Cuban Missile Crisis, came to actual execution and nuclear war**, either local or general. How many were not bluffs, implying a presidential willingness to turn the trigger for nuclear war over to an opponent. (I believe Nixon’s Duck Hook ultimatum in 1969 was not a bluff, until October 15, when the Moratorium convinced him that carrying it out would not succeed and would be too politically costly. This was probably also true of Ike’s threats, in 1953, 1954, 1958.)
- (g) The **delegation** of authority to launch nuclear weapons. (Never an issue for the two groups in question, though it was a political issue in 1964, proposed by Goldwater and falsely denied by LBJ). They didn’t know, and they believed presidential denials or took silence as denial.
- (h) The number and seriousness of **accidents and false alarms** over the years. (Until Schlosser’s recent book, despite works by Sagan).
- (i) As a result of ignorance about b and c above, and especially about e, f, g and h, both groups (antinuclear activists and arms controllers) have greatly **underestimated the historical danger nuclear weapons have posed over the last sixty years.**
- (j) Pressure by US allies for nuclear guarantees (partly for their own budgetary reasons, and largely in ignorance of the realities of nuclear war and the prospective impact on their own countries: aside from nuclear winter). (Allied attitudes are commonly left out of the picture. Recent attitudes of “new Europe”—supporting FU threats against Russia, over Ukraine or Poland-- are particularly worrisome.)
- (k) Recent data confirming and strengthening earlier analyses of **nuclear winter**. After a flurry of discussion of nuclear winter in the early Eighties, antinuclear

activists and arms controllers largely retreated in face of the specious attacks by the Merchants of Doubt. And that is still true (except for the Humanitarian Law conferences in the last two years). Thus, they have greatly underestimated the global impact on humanity of nuclear war should it occur, the risk of near-extinction.

- (l) They have been ignorant of the degree to which the declared non-proliferation objectives and policy of the US have been fraudulent, in favor of a covert, selective proliferation-permissive policy (Israel, India, Pakistan)-- and an unwillingness to compromise objectives of maintaining FU threats, strategic superiority and modernization, damage-limitation (including maintaining bases near Russia for surveillance of tests, in Pakistan and elsewhere) or alliance relationships (Pakistan, India, Israel)-- over and against non-proliferation objectives since 1964, either in the above countries or in potential adversaries like Iran or North Korea or more widely.

In sum, they have been as ignorant as the public of **the nuclear dimension of our foreign policy**, starting with Hiroshima (ignoring the analyses of Blackett and Alperovitz, to the present), NATO and the covert nuclear crises.

Likewise, they have accepted at face value the claims of US arms control negotiations to be aimed at “stability”—when by any valid analysis US have actual tended to promote instability, untrammelled by the actual agreements—and at non-proliferation, when US policies actual promote proliferation (along with tolerating it among allies).

On (4): How the ignorance and silence of antinuclear activists and arms controllers about the subjects above have limited their effectiveness, in my opinion:

- a) Their emphasis almost exclusively on numbers of weapons and launchers—by these groups as by the US and SU in arms control negotiations—obscures and contributes to ignorance by the publics and Congress about all the issues above.

It leads to underestimating the risk these weapons pose to human survival, by neglecting to elucidate how it is that nuclear war might arise in the future and how close it has come in the past, how often.

It leads the public to believe that the actual “large” reductions in numbers of warheads by Russia and the US means that the problem of nuclear war has gone away, or is in the process of disappearing, and that no public pressure is needed.

- b) The slogan of “overkill”—measuring the numbers and yields of the weapons by their ability to kill people—has not succeeded in mobilizing the public (except during the Freeze campaign, which was effectively thwarted by Reagan); and is ignored by the insiders, since it is irrelevant to—and in ignorance of-- what they regard as the real functions of the functions, the motives that actually drive their programs, which are not subjected to public critique or opposition.
- c) These groups are largely ignorant of the critical role of these internal aims and motives and criteria, and thus **fail to pose any direct opposition** to them: damage-limitation, first use and first strike threats (even when the groups are aware of these, as in NATO during the Cold War), delegation, decapitation, preemption, launch on warning.

Thus, the characteristics of the arms race that are most conducive to the actual danger of nuclear war **go unchallenged by outsiders, even specialists**. (I avoid the word “experts,” which is mostly misleading in this context). (Actually, relatively few specialists, even those who have been officials either in arms control or in Pentagon war planning, are very aware, if at all, of these critical objectives, any more than is the general public or Congress).

- d) The description during the Freeze movement of the impact on a single city of a single 1MT warhead was very effective, and enlightened audiences for the first time of the differences between an H-bomb vs. an A-bomb. But even Jonathan Schell’s book on The Fate of Humanity—focusing on ozone effects—was published before the nuclear winter calculations of the effect of smoke became widely known, and the movement (or arms controllers) have never emphasized the issue (including recent analysis of a war even between India and Pakistan with A-weapons) of nuclear winter, in the light of confirmation in the past decade.
- e) Thus (c and d) the public has been allowed to believe—in line with government assurances, and with little challenge by activists or outside arms controllers-- that with the ending of the Cold War and great “progress” in arms reductions, nuclear danger has contracted to the threat to an individual city by a terrorist weapon, with the risk of an all-out exchange between the US and Russia going down close to zero in their eyes, and without their realizing that even a very low risk of such a war poses the possibility of human extinction, or at least the death of urban civilization.

That complacency (in context with other challenges to distract them, including climate and terrorism and the economy) is enough to account for the near-extinction of the anti-nuclear movement, and the lack of any public

support or Congressional support for the efforts of persisting arms controllers, with resulting ineffectiveness.

On (2): What do I want to tell the public?

- a) The risk of large-scale nuclear war is not zero, or close to it (even though it is less than during the Cold War, and probably will remain so, even with a new Cold War with Russia or China).
- b) In fact, it is significantly large. What would that be, at a minimum? 1%? **Given the possibility of nuclear winter** (below) as a consequence, .01% would be significantly large! (Just as the top .01% of the income and wealth spectrum is more than “significant” in domestic influence, in fact, dominating!) But-- I want them to find out--it’s much higher than that! Perhaps not less than, say, 5% over the next fifty years, perhaps higher.
- c) And there’s no excuse, no remotely sufficient justification at all, for allowing it to remain that high another year: which is as long as it would take to reduce it drastically. (Although, tragically, for domestic political reasons it is extremely unlikely that measures that could quickly reduce it will be adopted for years to come.)
- d) The American public has been deliberately misled by their government for sixty years on the nature of the nuclear danger that has confronted us. From 1945 to 1965, it was **never** a danger of a Soviet nuclear attack on the US or its allies, either preemptive or surprise. There was no real possibility of that. **From the late ‘50’s on, the real danger to us—and to the whole world—was from a US first-strike against the Soviet Union.**

That was joined from about 1965 by the possibility of—not a Soviet surprise attack, preventive war, but-- Soviet preemption of a feared US first-strike. That might have arisen either on a false alarm or false strategic warning or by valid warning of US attack. Such a possibility threatened the world’s population with annihilation: a **second** Doomsday Machine. **And two rival Doomsday Machines, both on hair-triggers, are far, far more dangerous than one!**

But the Soviet capability and readiness for Doomsday destruction, too, was a result of US nuclear policy: a rejection of real attempts to stop the arms race by negotiation or unilateral measures; US reliance on FS threat to defend Europe, and even, especially, Berlin; US first-strike posture, to back up this FS threat; US FU threats against SU allies elsewhere in the world (NVN, NK, China).

Thus, our own nuclear policy, weapons and threats, eventually evoking a comparable Soviet capability, have always been the major source of

danger to us (and the world) in the nuclear era. And that is still true

(although the Russian threat may or may not be as susceptible to our influence in a different direction as it might have been at various times earlier).

- e) It is flatly untrue, as the public has often been led to believe, that US nuclear weapons “have not been used since 1945.” **They have been used by US presidents—all of them—dozens of times since Hiroshima and Nagasaki**, usually in secret from the US public (though not its opponents): used in the exact sense that a gun is used when it is pointed at an adversary face to face, whether or not the trigger is pulled.

To get one’s way without pulling the trigger is a successful use, one of the major motives a handgun is purchased: and the major reason why nuclear weapons are acquired. Some of the US threats were bluffs, in the president’s eyes, but many were not. Not all of them were successful, and some that the presidents saw as successes were not likely caused by the nuclear threat.

These uses of nuclear weapons in first-use (FU) threats--threats to initiate nuclear attacks in an otherwise conventional conflict—include crises in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, the Taiwan Straits, Berlin, and others, several dozen in all reaching up to the present day, with repeated assurances by major presidential candidates including the incumbents that “all options are on the table” with respect to Iran.

The ability and readiness to make such threats credibly, and if need be to carry them out, is among the factors at the heart of our foreign policy, a critical **nuclear dimension to American involvement in world affairs** of which the American public is generally unaware: just as they are unaware of US covert actions abroad, thanks in both cases to deliberate and effective government secrecy and deception.

Our strategic nuclear forces, as well, are related to this hidden nuclear dimension of our foreign policy. Their size and characteristics have been determined in order to back up these first-use threats with the capability to launch a disarming, US “damage-limiting” attack on the Soviet Union/Russia, in order to deter or respond to Soviet “second-use” of nuclear weapons should they consider retaliating to US tactical first-use. Thus, by this threat, to make our FU threats against Soviet forces (around Berlin) or their allies (North Korea, China, North Vietnam) safe to carry out if necessary, and thereby credible and effective.

- f) The motives/criteria that have been rationalizing the shape and buildup of our strategic forces for sixty years have **not** been deterrence of nuclear

attack on the US but rather improving the “first-strike” capabilities, specifically “damage-limiting” to the US in the event of US preemption on warning or escalation of a conventional or limited nuclear war (mainly in Europe: now, potentially, Ukraine). Damage-limiting, supposedly, by means of preemptive counterforce—fast response to tactical warning, possibly launch on warning--and decapitation, along with destruction of the Soviet “urban-industrial” targets, essentially population.

- g) That is still true, although this criterion/objective has been essentially a hoax, mirage, infeasible to achieve, for about fifty of those years: since the Soviets acquired SLBMs and a large force of hardened ICBMs. Even striking first, it has not been feasible to avoid the effective total destruction of US society (even earlier, that was not feasible for Western Europe), by blast, heat, radiation and fallout alone from Soviet/Russian retaliation.
- h) Beyond that, the previously unknown (until 1983) and still ignored phenomenon of **nuclear winter** from smoke in the upper stratosphere worldwide from cities burning from our US attacks alone (aside from Soviet retaliation, which would have the same effect on the globe) would prevent harvests for a decade, killing most humans on earth, including Americans, from starvation within a year or two.
- i) Thus, carrying out the Major Attack Options in the president’s “football,” under any circumstances, would not only be suicidal for the US and NATO but near-omnicidal, leading to the near-extinction of humanity and of most other species larger than insects and bacteria.

A major message of this book to the American and world public should be the confirmation in the last decade (vs. “doubters”) of nuclear winter. And of the environmental effects of even limited nuclear war, as between Pakistan and India (2 billion dead from famine). Thus, the status entire world population as “stakeholders” on issues of nuclear disarmament and non-use, vs. threats and arsenals

- j) To carry out such attacks would clearly be immoral, evil, (illegal under humanitarian law). But even to threaten them, to prepare for them and maintain fast-response readiness for them—at clear risk of triggering such attacks under some circumstances (even while deterring various attacks in other circumstances)-- either by ourselves or the Russians is also thoroughly unjustifiable, even wicked, evil, reckless and irresponsible beyond any human precedent. Either is insane, and always has been.
- k) **All** of our nuclear plans and threats since 1945 have been based on what Richard Nixon in 1968 called his “madman theory” (or I referred to in 1959 lectures as “the political uses of madness.”) Given the disproportionality, indiscriminate murderousness and danger of escalation of even the most

limited of our FU threats in regional conflicts, and the implicit omnicide of our NATO “defense” policy or our plans for retaliation to Soviet attack, these threats have depended for their credibility and effectiveness on an **appearance of madness** in US (and NATO) leaders.

That appearance has generally been within their powers. But unhappily, that image has been far from entirely fraudulent. **Real madness** (all too ordinary for great powers in the nuclear era) has been in play throughout.

- l) Since the end of the Cold War twenty-six years ago, probably the greatest remaining risk of all-out war is by a preemptive attack by one side or the other triggered by an electronic false alarm (of a sort that has occurred repeatedly on both sides) or an accidental nuclear detonation (which was a non-zero risk in a number of previous accidents).

(The risk is not negligible of such an attack being triggered by an apocalyptic terrorist group—like Aum Shinrikyo or conceivably Al Qaeda—with the capability to create a nuclear explosion in Washington or Moscow).

- m) The danger that such a false alarm would lead to a preemptive attack derives largely from the existence on both sides of land-based missile forces, each vulnerable to attack by the other: each, therefore, kept on a high state of alert, ready to launch within minutes of warning and orders, in order i) to avoid their own destruction, and ii) to accomplish destruction of as many as possible of the other’s land-based missiles before they all can be launched. Each side also targets the other’s command and control, in hopes of preventing or disorganizing the launch, in particular, of its land-based missiles before they can be destroyed.
- n) The easiest and fastest way to reduce that risk—and indeed, the overall danger of nuclear war-- drastically is **to dismantle the US land-based missile force, the Minuteman III** (currently scheduled, under Obama, for “refurbishment”), the land-based leg of the “triad.” (The bombers should go, or lose their mission, as well, though that’s somewhat less urgent. No real excuse for them either. The Russians should be deprived of those targets for preemption, too, and the US deprived of the necessity to get them into the air on tactical warning.
- o) [The following is a message more for arms controllers and antinuclear activists than for the general public] Concurrently (as soon as politically possible), the US Trident and SLBM force should be drastically reduced to give up their capability to target and destroy the entire Russian land-based missile force (on which the Russians choose to rely far more than does the US,

so they will be more reluctant to eliminate it, desirable as that would be for themselves and the world).

Having deprived the Russians of most of their high-priority, time-urgent targets for those forces by dismantling the US Minuteman silos and their control centers, the remaining incentive for the Russians to launch their ICBMs on warning—to avert their being destroyed by US SLBMs (accurate, short-warning and now in large numbers)—would be eliminated. Launch on warning would no longer be susceptible of being rationalized strategically on either side, neither for Russian ICBMs nor for US SLBMs.

- p) The **sole purpose** of US nuclear weapons should be to deter nuclear attack on the US and its allies. That means: no motive or criterion of damage-limiting to the US in general war; no support of FU threats (which are to be foregone decisively, a no-first-use (NFU) policy; no extended deterrence, no “nuclear umbrella” over allies; [no tacit support to Air Force desires for a strategic nuclear FS mission, or to MIC and their Congressional sponsors and nuclear weapons labs for large-scale strategic budgeting, development and production of nuclear weapons].; no use of FU threats in US foreign policy; no bid for alliance or regional hegemony on the basis of such threats;
- q) That sole purpose can and should be accomplished with radically lowered numbers of US nuclear weapons, primarily SLBMs (and a small number of cruise missiles). (That is why this definition of purpose has been so stiffly, and successfully fought in the Pentagon—and would be in Congress, if debate ever extended to it—despite its having some, unidentified, advocates inside.)
- r) It should also be accompanied by: (see hoped-for effects below):

NFU declaration by US,

campaign to get others to agree (UK, should be France but I suppose it won't, used to be China, maybe again, used to be Russia but it will be hard now, India maybe, Pakistan and Israel and NK probably no, last hold-outs perhaps with France (France for no reason, just “prestige” and “grandeur” and stubbornness). That's really OK: big step forward just to get US (and NATO: no problem getting most of “old Europe” to agree; problem with “new Europe,” especially Poland and perhaps Czech Republic and Slovakia (!) since Ukraine: likewise Russia; but then, likewise US!

Ratification of CTB

International end of production of fissile materials

Negotiations (OK, endless) on elimination of nuclear weapons

Strong international controls on storage and transport of fissile materials; transparency of numbers, locations; inspection.

Very limited ABM on either side, if any. (Not enough to negate the other superpower's reduced deterrent force.)

On (5): What secrets have I kept to myself (too long)?

- a) US strategic plans for general nuclear war have always been essentially first-strike plans.
- b) Under Eisenhower—long regarded as our wisest, most prudent postwar president—these were the only plans he permitted for US response in any conflict with Soviet troops, anywhere in the world, whatever the circumstances of initiation (e.g., an uprising in the Eastern bloc in which NATO or US troops became involved, a conflict over Berlin).
- c) Moreover, they planned all-out destruction of urban-industrial areas in any war with the SU not only in the SU but in China.
- d) The overall casualties from such US attacks, from fallout and blast (not fire, or smoke) were estimated to be 600 million, half of them outside the SU and China, including our allies.
- e) Eisenhower—followed by at least three later presidents, probably all of them to the president—delegated the initiation of nuclear war to subordinate commanders (who sub-delegated it still lower) under various circumstances: a deeply guarded secret for at least forty years, with current arrangements still deeply secret, and the public almost entirely unaware that delegation has ever been granted, in the face of explicit presidential denials.
- f) The Taiwan Straits crisis of 1958 was a nuclear crisis, with the trigger to US nuclear attacks essentially in the hands of the Chinese Communists. (Hardly anyone outsider the government guessed then or later how seriously Eisenhower, Dulles and the JCS had taken the possibility of US-initiated nuclear war, even general war.)
- g) The role of JFK and RFK in the Cuban Missile Crisis. I believe, on evidence little known or little noted, JFK was secretly ready, almost from the beginning, to concede if necessary—by accepting an overt trade of the Turkish missiles for the Cuban missiles—but, throughout the first twelve days, “not yet. His delay in accepting that compromise gave the US victory—when Khrushchev capitulated to pressures that almost no analyst has hitherto recognized--but it could easily have led to the end of civilization.

The latter possibility was also risked by a number of choices by Khrushchev to be discussed, several of them still inexplicable. Their joint coercive tactics came close to causing an explosion at several points (some secretly known to me in 1964, others only later). I knew in 1964 that the crisis had been more

dangerous than most insiders knew; it is now clear that it was still more dangerous, by far, than I or anyone knew then.

How Khrushchev came to give in and end the crisis has remained unknown to virtually all analysts to this day; I alone seem to know of RFK's double ultimatum on Saturday night, which he revealed to me in 1964. However, in the light of other, previously secret factors, that second ultimatum was not as critical as I have long thought. But the conclusion I drew from it—that Khrushchev responded in justified fear of imminent, uncontrollable escalation to nuclear war—is even strengthened by these new revelations.

- h) I myself participated—without acknowledging it to myself until recently—in the process of making first-use and first-strike threats to the SU over Berlin, both in official speeches I myself proposed and drafted (Gilpatric) and in speeches whose drafts I worked on (Ann Arbor, Paris).
- i) The missile gap was more of an illusion that has ever been generally acknowledged. The SU arsenal of 4 ICBMs in 1961 was 1/10 of what even Richard Rhodes was reporting several decades later in his authoritative history, and far less than any RAND study had ever contemplated as a minimum threat.

It meant that our whole conception of Soviet aims and character, on which our arms buildup was predicated, had been mistaken, both in the Pentagon, CIA and RAND. Yet this led to no reevaluation of our own programs, plans or policy, which continued to careen toward catastrophe over Cuba or Berlin, and later.

- j) My impression at the time that the JCS and their war plans were **insane** was not mistaken. That was true of the whole US foreign policy, constructed and managed by civilian leadership, in which their nuclear plans were an essential part. And it has never become less so.

On (1) (and 2, 3)

--I believe both the public (P) and the arms control community (include disarmament, abolition, anti-nuclear activists)—ACC—have been living in a false consciousness for 50-60 years, ignorance and unawareness of crucial factors in our nuclear policy and posture and the hidden history of the nuclear era.

--This ignorance, mistaken beliefs, unawareness, leads them greatly to underestimate the past dangers of the nuclear arms race—it's something of a **miracle** that there has been no all-out nuclear war, nor even limited nuclear wars or accidental explosions. (Despite Korea, Vietnam, the Gulf War, Iraq—all of which

could have produced at least limited, one-sided nuclear war; and despite numerous accidents and false alarms.)

(though I have to conclude, in light of that history, that the risks **were** somewhat less than I thought: the systemic resistance to carrying out threats—by presidents, in context of public attitudes—was somewhat greater than I gave them credit for, and the built-in safeguards against accidental detonations in the case of the frequent, secret, accidents with nuclear weapons, likewise; individuals on both sides chose to pass on what they concluded were false alarms;

some unauthorized actions (UA) (Cuban AA, the SAM, the prospect of UA by Soviet missile crews in Cuba under attack) scared Khrushchev, in the face of RFK's double ultimatum (a bluff!), into fast action to concede (in large part for reasons of which the US was unaware: SU nuclear warheads in Cuba, for missiles and tactical weapons—which K unaccountably chose not to reveal to us: all unforeseeable factors that kept what both JFK and K intended to be bluffs from actually exploding into general war, the end of humanity due to a consequence of which both were unaware, nuclear winter.

Above all, the unforeseeable ending of the Cold War in 1989. Though (lower) risk continued, to the present.

Thus, the belief—by much of the public and ACC, that nuclear war was “inevitable” by the end of the century (Helen Caldicott) or much earlier (me in 1959, and at various times later)—was mistaken.

It was, nevertheless, a miracle that none of these incidents (the C-II in particular) led to nuclear detonations over the sixty-five years since 1950 (Seventieth anniversary of Hiroshima is coming up this year!). The belief by many that deterrence was thoroughly reliable, that the risks were low or close to zero was also mistaken, in my view. I believe that reflected ignorance of some of the history of which I became aware from 1958 on, including what I learned from unclassified sources about FU threats in 194-81 and later, and what I and others learned from revelations about C-II in the '90's and later, and what I've learned about nuclear winter in the last few years (still unknown to the public and most of the ACC).

--Both the public and the arms control community are ignorant of the nature of our general war plans (SIOP) and how and when they have been meant to be executed (or why they are what they are).

--They are unaware of how these plans relate to our policy and practice of (maintaining far-flung US hegemony, not only with NATO but world-wide, up to the borders of the “Sino-Soviet Bloc”, by means of) FU threats.

--Thus, the ACC is ignorant of the nature of the internal (Pentagon, White House) resistance to reducing drastically the number of US warheads (to less than 1500 or

1000, even today; or, enough to avert nuclear winter) (“even if the SU/Russia are willing to go lower, mutually”—which is no longer the case at the moment (sob)).

The ACC decades-long focus on “overkill” reflects their false belief that the internal rationale for the numbers and nature (accuracy, yield, etc.) of warheads is solely that of deterring nuclear attack. The words “damage limitation” are hardly in their consciousness (or that of P), or the relation of these words to first-strike plans, preparations and threats, and to extended deterrence, US alliance relationships and sphere of influence.

Nor do they understand that the words “prevail” (or “win”) refer to supposed postwar balance, “acceptable outcomes” (without which, war termination is not contemplated), which relate to destruction of Soviet/Russian “war-supporting resources, urban-industrial targets,” in addition to S/R missiles and bases. Thus, there exists a “rock-bottom” limit to warhead numbers, which must cover all these in addition to (reduced) Soviet offensive missile targets.

In the absence of outside criticism of the plans (which remain secret), Pentagon planners have not been exposed to the contradiction of their intention to target command and control, “decapitation” (especially Moscow) with any concept of prevailing or war termination at all, let alone any remaining notion of a coercive strategy.

So the devotion of both Air Force and Navy planners to counterforce planning and an aim of prevailing, and the number of warheads necessary to carry it out, is inexplicable to the arms control community (ACC), which repeatedly encounters immovable obstacles to reductions that the ACC believe logically compelling, for reasons the ACC neither understands nor does or can criticize and oppose effectively.

The ACC never focuses on the need, or demand, to change the **aims and functions** of our strategic forces to achieve reductions radical enough to a) avert nuclear winter, and (b) motivate other NWS to reduce their own arsenals, and to motivate NNWS with a potential to acquire nuclear weapons not to do so, not to proliferate further.

--Both public and ACC have been unaware of the number of times presidents have threatened first-use of nuclear weapons (FU). And they unaware of how seriously some of these presidents have taken the threats;

how much our foreign policy has rested on the ability and willingness to make such threats;

how close some of them have come to being carried out, subject to the behavior of our opponents (and to unauthorized actions or subordinate actions, as in the case of the submarine/destroyer duel in the Cuban Missile Crisis (C-II), or the unauthorized

SAM firing the same day in C-II, or the mistaken U-2 flight over the SU (Soviet Union) that same day;

--the relation of the policy encouraging or resting on those threats to the nature and scale of our strategic forces:

namely, that in order to make credible **US FU threats against SU allies**, clients or forces, there was a need plausibly to **deter** Soviet **second-use** retaliation to our FU, by credibly threatening to escalate, ultimately to a US FS (a disarming strike against the whole Soviet system, requiring very large numbers of accurate, high-yield weapons. (This is the real meaning of the mysterious “full spectrum dominance” that Nitze and others long talked about: the ultimate credibility of a US FS against the SU).

This was the **primary** strategic function (ignoring domestic political and Service incentives, and alliance diplomacy, which were tacitly critical) of our strategic forces: not, as the public and ACC were led to believe, the deterrence of a Soviet first strike against the US or its forces. This was especially true of our foreign policy with respect to Europe, the defense of our position in Berlin in particular, but also the defense of West Germany and the rest of West Europe. But it also applied elsewhere, as in C-II and the Taiwan Straits (where Eisenhower claimed to believe that the nuclear attacks that might be necessary on China would lead to Soviet general war attacks).

Nothing of this has been in the consciousness of the ACC or P, or reflected in their campaigns for arms reductions. (In other words, the real internal rationale for our posture has been ignored, and thus the demands from outside appear simply irrelevant to the insiders to their secret efforts to maintain “national security,” and to those few Congresspersons who are privy to these efforts and preside over their budget.

I’ve long believed, therefore, that awareness of this in the ACC and P and resulting change in the focus of criticism, protest, demands and political pressure, **might** be effective in bringing about critical change in our arsenal, our posture, our foreign policy (or at least, its dependence on nuclear threats)—and facilitate nonproliferation efforts, while greatly reducing the chance of “accidental” war.

I must say that my confidence has steadily lowered over the years that such changes in public or ACC consciousness and changes in their focus of pressure would actually bring about change in US policy. (Any more than individual “insight” into one’s past and present behavior, and the supposed roots of it, reliably leads to change in one’s behavior. It doesn’t hoit, I guess). Anyway, I’ve long proposed—and still do, this spring—to act **as if** acts of truth-telling aimed at public consciousness **might** make **some** difference for the better. They have, occasionally. What else do I have, to do? And given the stakes (all of human civilization and existence), it’s worth the effort.

I believe there remains—contrary to the belief of the public since the end of the Cold War— a “significant” (non-zero: not even close to it) chance/probability of all-out nuclear war.

Given the public’s supposition that the chance of bilateral US-Russian nuclear war is extremely low (perhaps zero: though the current Ukraine crisis should challenge that, more than it has yet), public pressure and ACC pressure for drastic change in our nuclear policies, “speeding up” or (better) changing the focus of arms reduction negotiations, has virtually disappeared for the last 25 years.

There is no effective antinuclear movement any more. The focus of widespread activism has shifted exclusively to the climate problem: which fully deserves such effort. (Though it faces **very** obdurate corporate resistance, which has so far prevented any significant change. The test case of the Keystone XL pipeline comes up within weeks, with the Republican congress defying Obama commitment to veto it).

I would like the public and ACC to share my belief that (contrary to climate activists, like Bill McKibben) there is not just one but **two** “existential threats” to humanity now: climate and nuclear war.

In light of the new data confirming the nuclear winter phenomenon, even a very small chance (1%, .1%, .01%—much smaller than I believe the real risk to be) either of all-out war or of regional nuclear wars (India-Pakistan) should be regarded as **intolerable**, a calamitous persistence of danger, deserving of urgent and committed protest and resistance, on a level with the comparably calamitous prospect of catastrophic man-made climate change (which at present appears almost certain, despite a widespread public movement against it, which does not exist in the nuclear case).

In other words, I think the public should be made aware of a nuclear danger that—while far less certain than the prospect of climatic catastrophe—poses quite comparable existential danger to civilization and to humanity itself (and other forms of life), and is programmatically far more susceptible to remedial action than is the climate, with essentially no change in the way of life or material prosperity of the public required (!).

Perhaps I shouldn’t say “susceptible,” given the actual opposition to change by certain power elites, and its relation to American empire (and Russian sphere of influence, it appears.) But what needs to be done to reduce the danger is easy to specify, in terms of concrete steps. And in contrast to the climate problem, taking these steps wouldn’t directly involve major social costs to the public, inconvenience, changes in our whole industrial system. (The profits of some MIC corporations would be challenged—not quite as powerful as the energy companies, but very influential nevertheless—and a very small number of jobs.)

Still, a quite large challenge to existing ideology would be involved. The public has been indoctrinated falsely for more than half a century in ways that would resist even changes that are simple to describe and physically simple and straightforward to carry out. (In particular: **dismantlement of US MM missiles and silos**. It's not actually easy to rationalize any need for them now, though with the new Cold War in the last year, it's easy to oppose any "unilateral disarmament" that could be alleged to embolden the Russians in Ukraine.

The latter proposition—both parts of it—apply all the more to the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons from Europe.

Bad news. Given the Ukraine conflict, this would have been a bad season for my book and proposals to have appeared (as was the fall of 2002 for *Secrets*—while the mainstream media were being geared up for an attack on Iraq. The fall of 2001, the original deadline, would have been even worse: 9-11). And that could still be true next year. In other words, the environment for real reduction of the nuclear danger may just now have changed for the worse, for a prolonged period. But that may not be true a year from now: that's what I'm gambling on now.

I think it's realistic to expect that those who read my account will acquire a new appreciation of the dangers we lived through some forty to fifty years ago, and even to recognize the likelihood that comparable dangers have persisted since then and confront us today. This despite claims by the Pentagon and Executive that this is all past history and that everything has changed for the better. That is untrue, and there is much testimony in published analyses to the contrary. But I don't personally have documents or experience to disprove this.

Others could provide that, if they were provoked by my book to do so. That might be the most realistic hope for effective impact of my book, unlikely though that prospect is from past experience. I.e., it is unlikely that current insiders would do what they should—emulate Snowden and Manning, with respect to current nuclear plans and their dangers.

But it's much less unlikely that my book and my other efforts in connection with it might stimulate some significant truth-telling by **former** insiders in support of my arguments, revelations and proposals. That is actually a fairly realistic objective.

I think:

The world is going to hell, literally. Toward global warming and nuclear winter, either or both (fire and ice). (In Dante's *Inferno*, the innermost circle of hell is the coldest, a frozen lake in which Satan is immersed up to the waist.)

Nuclear war between Russia and the US, though much less likely than before, is still possible, with effects far more catastrophic than earlier imagined. It is an existential danger far more easily remediable than that of climate change, whose persistence should be (but is not) generally regarded as intolerable.

Likewise, regional nuclear wars (e.g., India-Pakistan) are also possible, more likely, with nuclear winter effects that threaten two billion people with famine. Also, nuclear terrorist attacks on large cities (with the likely effect of ending real democracy where it exists, and stimulating further proliferation.

I think climatic catastrophic is almost certain within fifty to a hundred years (possibly much sooner: twenty to thirty), whatever a mass movement of likely dimensions actually does. Regional nuclear wars are highly likely in that time (in contrast to the last sixty years), with a massive die-off from famine (two billion people or more). All-out nuclear war will remain possible, 1-10%, with near-extinction as a consequence (like the asteroid collision 65 millions years ago).

Thus, in the rivalry between "us" and all the other larger forms of life, we Americans, and humans, are not on the wrong side. We *are* the wrong side.

The likely survivors: bacteria, insects, and for a while perhaps, a relatively few humans: something between 1% and .01% of the current human population.

National addictions, not only by the US, to fossil fuels and nuclear weapon seem beyond our human ability to control; and there is no higher power, above humanity, to help us.

However, with respect to both existential threats, unforeseeable "miracles" are possible, however unlikely: like the unforeseen non-violent collapse of the SU and the Cold War, non-violent majority rule in South Africa and Spain; and the miracle of no nuclear detonations on humans in the last sixty years.

Moreover, it is probably possible by human effort to postpone the full experience of hell; this is definitely worth striving for, by me and others.

In both cases, "merchants of doubt" (about nuclear winter and the risks of our nuclear policies, about man-caused climate change and the need for radical change) and effective secrecy have pacified public protest and resistance to the current hell-bent course.

My truth-telling memoir to dispel the doubts about nuclear danger has very little chance of having any effect whatever (or being noticed, depending on competing events).

Nevertheless, I think a contributing factor (in both cases: I focus on the nuclear) is public ignorance, long sustained by governmental secrecy and deception.

With help from the complicity of Congress and the media, this ignorance is likely to be invincible, in the large; yet, it has scarcely ever been challenged by a former insider, as I propose to try.

An Ellsberg/ Manning/Snowden on the inside now could make a great difference by a large-scale revelation of plans, estimates, studies—comparable to the Pentagon Papers—on nuclear planning (though such a whistleblower would risk life in prison, as we did, and probably get it, as the price of saving civilization from destruction.

My own efforts face the likelihood of being dismissed as “horrifying” but old news, about the past (as the Pentagon Papers themselves were regarded; and I don’t have the equivalent of Nixon’s NSSM-1 up my sleeve this time).

Hopefully, they might stimulate recent insiders with more timely information to corroborate what I say in terms of its current relevance: ideally in Congressional hearings, although Republican control of Congress now makes this more unlikely.

It’s not possible to stop proliferation—or indeed, to stop our **promoting** proliferation—while the US and Russia maintain thousands **or even hundreds** of nuclear weapons on alert, and make first-use threats.

It will be impossible to achieve any of these requirements if the present Obama plan for “refurbishing” the entire nuclear development, production and deployment system (at a cost of over a trillion dollars) is pursued. (His successor, whether Republican or Hillary, is even more likely than Obama to continue it). Game over?

With US and Russian nuclear arsenals at or near their present levels and posture (including the existence of US land-based missiles, “de-alerted” or not, along with large numbers of SLBM warheads at sea), it is **not possible** to:

- 1) effectively encourage and press potential nuclear-weapons-states from acquiring nuclear weapons (an effective non-proliferation campaign);
- 2) eliminate the danger of full-scale nuclear winter (near-extinction);
- 3) eliminate, or reduce to near-zero the chance of attempted “preemption” based on a false alarm or misguided strategic fears (that a large regional conflict will escalate.

All of these three aims could be achieved by the US and Russia, accompanied by massive reductions of the arsenals of each, initially (perhaps unilaterally) to the

neighborhood of the other NWS aside from North Korea—several hundred warheads each, all sub-based—and then, multilaterally, to “minimum deterrence/deterrence only” levels of all the current NWS down to the level of North Korea presently (perhaps ten warheads).

But such reductions would be blocked on policy grounds, with resistance from the Pentagon/JCS/Air Force/Navy and their MIC and Congressional supporters, **unless** national doctrine was changed radically: to NFU; recognizing that damage-limiting against Russian forces is essentially infeasible (as JFK concluded in 1963), and thereby foregoing preemption, launching on warning, preemptive decapitation, counterforce (as JFK did not, nor any of his successors).

Such a –realistic—shift in policy would deprive the great bulk of our strategic forces of any strategic rationale: which could (!) help overcome domestic resistance to their dismantlement.

Friday, January 16, 2015,

I want:

(one sentence statements)

1. To reduce sharply the danger of large-scale nuclear war.
2. To make nuclear winter **impossible** (first, as a result of US attack; second, of Russian attack; third, of others, together or alone.)
3. To have NAS or other scientific body calculate authoritatively the results of executing various large US attack options: including **smoke**, fire and ozone effects, effects on sunlight and famine.
4. Declare US no-first-use (NFU) policy: “deterrence of nuclear attack on US or allies” as “sole purpose” of US nuclear weapons.
5. To eliminate the US land-based missile force (as an incentive either to US or Russian “preemptive” attack on warning). (Major reduction in risk of large-scale war).
6. To reduce greatly the number of Tridents and SLBM warheads. (Eliminate pressure on Russians to launch on warning, and eliminate possibility of US-caused nuclear winter).
7. Eliminate US tactical nuclear weapons in Europe.
8. US and others to ratify the CTB.
9. Halt production of weapons-grade nuclear material (with inspection, including for the NWS).